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ADMIRALTY LAW
SCOPE OF EMPLOYEE COVERAGE UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura
In an effort to mitigate the inequities that existed with regard
to worker's compensation coverage of shore-based maritime workers
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
of 1927 (LHWCA),I Congress amended the Act in 1972,2 extending
1 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970) (amended 1972). Prior to 1972, federal compensation bene-
fits were available only to employees whose injuries occurred on the navigable waters of the
United States and only if recovery had not been validly provided by state workmen's compen-
sation laws. Id. § 903(a). The LHWCA reflected a strict "situs" orientation which had been
developed through a long series of Supreme Court decisions reflecting the Court's determina-
tion to closely guard the federal maritime jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v.
Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See generally
Larson, The Conflict of Laws Problem Between the Longshoremen's Act and State Work-
men's Compensation Acts, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 699 (1972). The origins of the strict situs test
are to be found in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), wherein the Supreme
Court held that state compensation laws could not apply to persons injured within the federal
maritime jurisdiction since to permit varied state remedies would jeopardize the uniformity
of the law of admiralty. This decision left the shoreside worker with no workmen's compensa-
tion coverage if his injury occurred on the water side of the pier edge, a boundary that came
to be known as the Jensen line. This harsh rule was modified in Grant Smith-Porter Ship
Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922), where the Court permitted application of state workmen's
compensation laws to injuries occurring over navigable waters if the employee was engaged
in matters of local rather than maritime concern.
The LHWCA, enacted in 1927, filled the gap that still existed with regard to amphibious
workers such as longshoremen, who might be injured over navigable waters while engaged in
maritime matters. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a), 903(4) (1970) (amended 1972). Since the
Act stated that it was applicable only "if recovery . . . through workmen's compensation
proceedings may not validly be provided by State law," id. § 903(a), it was generally inter-
preted as incorporating the Rohde "maritime but local" doctrine. Additionally, federal and
state coverage were considered to be mutually exclusive. See, e.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-46, at 339 (1957); D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY & FEDERALISM 208,
304-05 (1970). Uncertain as to whether employment was maritime or local, many workers
sought the wrong remedy and many employers insured under the wrong system. See IA E.
BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 8 (7th rev. ed. E. Jhirad 1973) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICT].
In Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 256 (1942), the Supreme Court
alleviated the problem by recognizing a "twilight zone" into which the close "maritime but
local" cases fell. If a claim were within this zone, a claimant might pursue either his state
or federal remedy. Id. at 255-56. Finally, in Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962),
the Court eliminated the need for a "twilight zone" by holding that all injuries occurring on
navigable waters were compensable under the LHWCA. Id. at 126-27. Thus, situs became
the determinant with respect to coverage. See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S.
212 (1969). For a detailed history of Supreme Court decisions from Jensen to the amendment
of the LHWCA in 1972, see 1A BENEDICT, supra, §§ 1-13; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW
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the "situs" of a compensable injury to shoreside harbor facilities
adjoining navigable waters.3 At the same time, however, the amend-
ments added an employee "status" requirement limiting benefits to
"any person engaged in maritime employment, including any long-
shoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations. '4
Since the terms "maritime employment," "longshoreman," and
OF ADMIRALTY §§ 6-46 to 6-49 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK 2d].
Because all injuries occurring seaward of the Jensen line were compensable under the
LHWCA, whereas those occurring landward of the water line were under the jurisdiction of
state compensation laws, see, e.g., Victory Carriers v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), the situs test
resulted in a disparity in benefits available to workers performing the same tasks dependant
upon the site of their injury. See, e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212
(1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 48-51 infra; Smith, On the Waterfront at the
Pier's Edge: The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 56 CORNELL L.
REv. 114 (1970); Comment, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of
1927: Half-Way Protection for the Stevedore and the Longshoreman, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1553
(1966).
2 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-576 §§ 2-22, 86 Stat. 1251-65 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. V 1975)).
These amendments were enacted by Congress both to raise benefits to an adequate level and
to specifically remedy the disparity in benefits available to harbor workers performing the
same tasks because of the strict situs requirement of the LHWCA. See S. REP..No. 1125, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10 (1972), reprinted
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698-99, 4708, wherein it was stated: "The Commit-
tee believes that the compensation payable to a longshoreman or a ship repairman or builder
should not depend on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on land or
over water." Congress recognized the disparity in benefits, both between federal and state
compensation awards, and among the different state systems:
Thus, coverage of the present Act stops at the water's edge; injuries occurring on
land are covered by State Workmen's Compensation laws. The result is a disparity
in benefits payable for death or disability for the same type of injury depending on
which side of the water's edge and in which State the accident occurs.
To make matters worse, most State Workmen's Compensation provides bene-
fits which are inadequate ... .
S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4707.
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970)). Whereas the
original Act of 1927 limited coverage to the injuries occurring on navigable waters, including
any drydock, the present version provides:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death
of an employee but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier,
wharf, drydock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
vessel).
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1970)). The amend-
ments also included within the definition of "maritime employment" harborworkers, ship
repairmen, shipbuilders, and shipbreakers. Id. Under the original Act, any employee not
specifically exempted was covered, see 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1970) (amended 1972), provided
that his employer had some workers engaged in maritime employment. Id. § 902(4).
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"longshoring operations" were not defined, the years that have
elapsed since the passage of the amendments have seen much spec-
ulation as to their meaning and the concomitant breadth of em-
ployee coverage. 5 Until recently, however, there were no judicial
pronouncements concerning the amendments.' In Pittston Steve-
doring Corp. v. Dellaventura,7 the Second Circuit confronted the
task of interpreting the amendments, and held that maritime em-
ployees include, at the least, workers engaged in stripping, stuffing,
and checking containers8 and workers employed in handling cargo
during its journey between ship and consignee, provided that the
latter employees have spent "significant" time in directly loading
5 See, e.g., 1A BENEDICT, supra note 1, §§ 18-19; GimoaR & BLAcK 2d, supra note 1, § 6-
51; Gorman, The Longshoremen's Act After the 1972Amendments, 20 PAc. LAw., May 1974,
at 13; Vickery, Some Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 41 INS. COUNSEL J. 63 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Vickery].
During the past two years, at least six United States Courts of Appeals have considered
the scope of coverage provided by the LHWCA. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, Office
of Workers' Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v.
Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petitions for cert. filed sub nom. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v.
Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976) (No. 76-641), and Halter Marine Fabricators,
Inc. v. Nulty, 45 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1977) (No. 76-880); Stockman v. John T. Clark
& Son, 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Nov. 2,
1976) (No. 76-571); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976) (No. 76-
444); I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), affd in part and
rev 'd in part, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), petitions for cert. filed sub nom. Marine
Terminals, Inc. v. Brown, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976) (No. 76-706), and Adkins
v. I.T.O. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-730); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 179 (1976).
7 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Ca-
puto, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976) (No. 76-444).
A container is a receptacle in a rectangular metal module, similar in size and shape to
a railroad car, which is carried on ships specially designed to accommodate many such units.
Containers are generally packed (stuffed) with cargo or unpacked (stripped) in marshaling
areas located some distance from a ship's side, but within the terminal area. For movement
on land they are engineered to fit on chassis frames with wheels, and when so assembled the
units become the trailer sections of tractor-trailer trucks. See Olson & Scrogin, Containeri-
zation and Military Logistics, 6 J. MA. L. & CoM. 119, 119-20, 123 (1974); Schmeltzer &
Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the Container Revolution, 1 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 203, 235-
37 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Schmeltzer & Peavy].
Containerization has resulted in increased efficiency in the transportation of cargo since
it requires fewer ships, fewer seamen to man them, and fewer longshoremen to load and
unload them. Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra at 204, 235-37. In addition, the use of containers
has reduced the complete turnaround time for a cargo vessel from 36 to 8 hours. Brief for
International Longshoremen's Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 11, Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976). The use of containers has been rapidly increasing,
and it is estimated that "by 1980 approximately 85 percent of all commodities shipped in
international traffic will be transported in containers." Olson & Scrogin, supra, at 126 (cita-
tion omitted).
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and unloading cargo from a ship. The court also declared that for
an injury to be compensable it must occur within the new situs
boundaries of the Act.9
Pittston involved injuries sustained by employees of stevedor-
ing companies while working in areas adjoining navigable waters.10
544 F.2d at 56.
,0 The case was a consolidation of four appeals from decisions of the Benefits Review
Board of the Department of Labor (BRB). Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 3 BEN.
REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 13 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1975), afl'd, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 522 (1976) (No. 76-444); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 2 BEN. REv. BD.
SERV. (MB) 340 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1975), appeal dismissed as untimely, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1976); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Scaffidi, 3 BEN. REV. BD. SERv. (MB) 47 (Ben. Rev. Bd.
1975), dismissed as moot, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976); Blundo v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 2 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 376 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976) (No. 76-454). Only Caputo and Blundo were decided
on the merits. The Scaffidi petition was dismissed as a nonjusticiable controversy since the
employer's insurance carrier had failed to contest the award and had already paid. 544 F.2d
at 46. Rejecting the Stevedoring Company's contention that it was adversely affected by
virtue of possible increased premiums it would be forced to pay, the Second Circuit dismissed
the petition. Id. at 44-46, citing Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295 (1945). But see 3
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.13, at 272-73 (1958) (Gange decision is criti-
cized); cf. K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.08, at 438 (3d ed. 1972) (suggesting that
minimal injury in fact should confer standing). Noting the criticism of Gange by Professor
Davis, the Second Circuit declared that even if that case were to be overruled, the petitioner
would not be an aggrieved party since the increased premiums asserted were merely a possi-
bility. Moreover, the claimant would have retained his award even if the BRB's decision were
reversed. 544 F.2d at 45.
The Second Circuit dismissed the employer's petition in Dellaventura for failure to file
a timely petition for review pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 33
U.S.C. § 921(b) (1970)), which requires a petition to be filed with the circuit court within 60
days after the issuance of the BRB's order. 544 F.2d at 42-44. The dismissal of Dellaventura
made it unnecessary for the Second Circuit to resolve a procedural problem which has
plagued several other circuits: Whether the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs of the Department of Labor or the BRB, or either, is a proper party respondent in
an appeal taken to a United States Court of Appeals. Delegating the discussion to a footnote
since the issue was raised only in Dellaventura and thus need not be resolved, id. at 42 &
n.5, the court indicated in dictum that the BRB was the proper governmental respondent on
appeal. Id. at 42 n.5 (dictum). Positing that review without the government as a party would
be inappropriate even though sufficient adversity exists between the private parties, the court
stated that the BRB, rather than the Director, appeared to be within the contemplation of
33 U.S.C. §§ 921(a), 921(c) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 921(a), 921(b) (1970)).
544 F.2d at 42 n.5, citing FED. R. App. P. 15(a).
The BRB, however, sees itself not as "an administrative agency but [as] a judicial
tribunal" akin to the United States Tax Court. Washington, Benefit Review Board's New
Appellate Process Under the Longshoremen's Act, 11 FORUM 686, 695 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Washington] (author is Chairman of the BRB). Hence the BRB position is that it is
not a proper party in appeals from its own decisions. Id. at 694. In contrast, the Director of
the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs has asserted that he is the proper respondent
by virtue of: his statutory mandate as the delegate of the Secretary of Labor to provide
claimants with legal assistance, 33 U.S.C. § 939(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975); his duty to properly
administer the Act, see id.; 20 C.F.R. § 701.202 (1976); and his standing as an aggrieved
person, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (Supp. V 1975), since the Director is authorized to appear in
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Employed as a "checker," claimant Blundo slipped on some ice as
he was in the process of checking the contents of a container on the
19th Street pier in Brooklyn, New York. The container had been
removed from a vessel at a different pier and then transported to
the 19th Street facility for inspection by the United States Customs
Service before being released to the consignee.11
Claimant Caputo was employed at times as a terminal operator
and at times as a longshoreman. His injuries occurred inside a con-
signee's truck while he was helping load boxes of cheese from the
pier. This cargo had been discharged from a ship five days before
and had been moved to a holding area to await pickup. In the course
of Caputo's varied duties, he was required to spend some time work-
ing aboard ships. 2
In both cases compensation benefits were awarded by an ad-
ministrative law judge. 3 Finding that the claimants were within the
coverage section of the amended LHWCA, satisfying both situs and
status requirements, the Benefits Review Board (BRB)I4 affirmed
the awards. 5 An appeal was taken to the Second Circuit by the
employers who contested the propriety of the awards, contending
that the claimants' employment was not "maritime" in nature, and
proceedings before the BRB, 20 C.F.R. § 702.333(b) (1976). I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review
Bd., 542 F.2d 903, passim (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), petitions for cert. filed sub nor. Marine
Terminals, Inc. v. Brown, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976) (No. 76-706), and Adkins
v. I.T.O. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-730).
The circuits that have addressed this issue have reached conflicting results. In contrast
to the dicta of the Second Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit has held that the BRB is
not a proper respondent. Supporting the Board's position that it is an independent judicial
tribunal, the court stated: "To require the Board to appear as a party would parallel requiring
the District Court to appear and defend its decision upon direct appeal." McCord v. Benefits
Review Bd., 514 F.2d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam); accord, Nacirema Operating
Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 538 F.2d 73, 75 (3d Cir. 1976). The Fourth Circuit, although
agreeing with the District of Columbia Circuit that the BRB is not a proper party, I.T.O.
Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 542 F.2d at 907 n.4, has also agreed with the Pittston court's
opinion that the Director is not a proper respondent. Id. at 906-09. Thus, the Fourth Circuit
has decided that government participation in an appeal is unnecessary. Id. at 907 n.4.
11 544 F.2d at 41.
12 Id. at 42, 54.
1 Id. at 41-42. The administrative process under the amended LHWCA provides for an
initial hearing before an administrative law judge in accordance with § 5 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (Supp. V 1975).
"1 The 1972 amendments established the Benefits Review Board to hear appeals from
decisions of the administrative law judge. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (Supp. V 1975). A final order
of the Board is reviewable in a United States Court of Appeals. Id. § 921(c). For a discussion
of the new appellate process, see Washington, supra note 10, at 686-96.
I5 Caputo v. Northeast Marine Terminal Co., 3 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 13 (Ben. Rev.
Bd. 1975); Blundo v. International Terminal Operating Co., 2 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 376
(Ben. Rev. Bd. 1975).
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hence not within the ambit of the Act." Traditionally, the process
of loading and unloading cargo from seagoing vessels has been con-
sidered maritime employment.1 7 In the view of the Pittston employ-
ers, however, this process must involve a direct connection with a
ship, i.e., loading and unloading can only occur between the vessel
and the last (loading) or first (unloading) "point of rest" of the cargo
on the pier.'" Since the claimants' activities took place beyond these
limits, the employers argued the employment was not maritime.'9
In contrast, the BRB position was that the loading/unloading pro-
cess begins when cargo arrives at the pier for shipment outbound,
and ends when inbound cargo is deposited in a consignee's convey-
ance.2 1 Faced with these divergent contentions, the Second Circuit
had the definitional task of constructing the parameters of employee
coverage.
In affirming the BRB's decision, Judge Friendly, writing for a
majority of the panel, 21 took a broad view of the coverage provisions
of the Act. Noting the remedial nature of the amendments and the
liberal construction which should be afforded such legislation,2 2 the
court rejected the petitioners' "point of rest" theory as being too
narrow in scope.23 To support this conclusion, Judge Friendly
11 544 F.2d at 46-47.
17 See, e.g., Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 61-62 (1914); Drumgold v.
Plovba, 260 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Va. 1966) (mem.).
11 544 F.2d at 46-47. "Point of rest" is generally defined as the first storage or holding
area after the cargo leaves the ship or the last storage or holding area for the cargo before it
is taken aboard the ship. See, e.g., I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1087
(4th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), petition
for.cert. filed sub nom. Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Brown, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 30,
1976) (No. 76-706), and Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No.
76-730).-Support for this position may be found in Vickery, supra note 5, at 68.
" 544 F.2d at 46-47.
Id. at 47. The BRB has consistently taken this position. See, e.g., Watson v. John T.
Clark & Son, 2 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 47 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1975); Ford v. P.C. Pfeiffer Co.,
1 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 367 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1975), aff'd sub noam. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petitions for cert. filed sub nom. P.C. Pfeiffer
Co. v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976) (No. 76-641), and Halter Marine Fabrica-
tors, Inc. v. Nulty, 45 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1977) (No. 76-880); Avvento v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 1975 A.M.C. 153, 1 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. (MB) 174 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1974).
21 Judge Oakes joined Judge Friendly for the majority; Judge Lumbard dissented on the
issue of scope of coverage.
2 544 F.2d at 51, citing Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953).
2 544 F.2d at 51 n.18. Before proceeding with its analysis of the amendments, the
Pittston court first rejected several arguments advanced by the parties. The court declined
to accept claimants' contention that it should apply the presumption of coverage found in 33
U.S.C. § 920(a) (1970), which provides that in questionable cases, doubt should be resolved
in favor of coverage. 544 F.2d at 48. Finding that the issue at hand was "an interpretative
question of general import," the court explained that the presumption is operative only after
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a definitional line has been established judicially, and applies to questionable cases falling
near that point.
Turning to the claimants' contention that deference is owed to decisions of administra-
tive agencies such as the BRB, the Pittston majority noted conflicting Supreme Court deci-
sions on the issue and concluded that when the matter is one of statutory interpretation, a
court has discretion to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. at 49; see K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRAIVE LAW TEXT § 30.05, at 551-55 (3d ed. 1972). In the instant case the choice not
to defer was predicated on the following determinations: (1) the BRB is not a policymaking
body with a need for flexibility; (2) it has not developed a record based on thorough analysis
of the maritime industry, but has instead decided individual cases as they arose without
establishing definitive guidelines; (3) the BRB had little expertise at the time it began its
work, and yet it has based its subsequent decisions on its initial inexperienced judgments;
(4) a court has greater competence in statutory interpretation. 544 F.2d at 49-50. The factors
influencing the Pittston court are consistent with the criteria enumerated by Professor Davis
in K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 30.07, at 556 (3d ed. 1972).
A contrary decision was reached by the Fifth Circuit in Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v.
Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petitions for cert. filed sub nom. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v.
Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976) (No. 76-641), and Halter Marine Fabricators,
Inc. v. Nulty, 45 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1977) (No. 76-880). There, the court stated that
it would not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, "so long as [that judgment] is
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, and so long as there
is a reasonable legal basis for the Board's conclusions." 539 F.2d at 541; accord, I.T.O. Corp.
v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1091-93 (4th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion), afl'd in
part and rev'd in part, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), petitions for cert. filed sub
nom. Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Brown, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976) (No. 76-706),
and Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-730).
In addition to the foregoing issues, the petitioners raised a constitutional question, con-
tending that by extending the definition of navigable waters to include land areas, see 33
U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. V 1975), Congress had exceeded its power to legislate under the
federal maritime jurisdiction. Traditionally, the maritime tort jurisdiction was limited to the
locality of the navigable waters, while maritime jurisdiction over contracts, was unlimited as
to locale and extended to all agreements made in connection with sea-related commerce,
DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776). The Second Circuit
summarily disposed of the constitutional claim, upholding congressional power to legislate
in this area on the basis of several Supreme Court decisions. Citing Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), wherein the Court applied without question the Admiralty
Extension Act of 1948, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970), which extended federal maritime tort jurisdic-
tion to injuries occurring on land through the instrumentality of seagoing vessels, and Naci-
rema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224 (1969), in which the Court expressly invited
Congress to extend federal workmen's compensation coverage landward, the Pittston court
found no constitutional bar to the legislation under federal maritime tort jurisdiction. 544
F.2d at 57. Moreover, the court indicated that even were this tort jurisdiction inadequate,
the amendments would certainly be an appropriate exercise of the maritime contract power
since employment contracts of maritime workers were involved. Id. See Nacirema Operating
Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 215 (1969), in which the Court stated: "Congress might have
extended coverage to all longshoremen by exercising its power over maritime contracts."
It might be argued that the status requirement of the amendments was influenced by
the possible jurisdictional problem since it appears that were there no status requirement
providing a nexus between maritime employment and a covered worker, an employment
contract could not be the basis of federal jurisdiction. This problem was examined by the
Fifth Circuit in Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petitions
for cert. filed sub nom. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976) (No.
76-641), and Halter Marine Fabricators, Inc. v. Nulty, 45 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1977)
(No. 76-880), which dealt in part with an employee who was injured on land while engaged
in ship building. Since this activity traditionally has not been considered within the maritime
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pointed to the language of the amendments which defines the term
"employee, ' 24 and found that "any longshoreman or other person
engaged in longshoring operations" is included within the broader
phrase "any person engaged in maritime employment."' Further-
more, the inclusion of "any longshoreman" as a category separate
from a "person engaged in longshoring operations" demonstrates
that Congress contemplated protection for a longshoreman "even
when he is not engaged in traditional longshoring activity. '2 Thus,
even assuming, arguendo, that "longshoring operations" can occur
only within the "point of rest" parameters, the court declared that
limiting coverage to this narrow area could not have been in-
tended.2 1
Turning then to the legislative history for guidance in deter-
mining the definition of "longshoreman," Judge Friendly noted that
the language of the amendments was certainly influenced by con-
gressional recognition of the changes wrought by containerization
and other modern shipping techniques which result in longshoremen
doing more work on shore now than in the past.2 8 "Stripping a con-
tainer of goods destined to different consignees," noted the Pittston
jurisdiction of the federal government, see, e.g., Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257
U.S. 469 (1922), the coverage provisions of the amendments were attacked as being outside
both federal maritime tort and contract jurisdictions. 539 F.2d at 544-45. Declaring that
Congress has the power to expand maritime jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit held that the 1972
amendments were a constitutionally valid exercise of that power. Id. at 545-46. But see
Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683, 692 (1973), in which
the author states that the coverage provisions of the amendments would be unconstitutional
if based on federal maritime jurisdiction alone, and suggests that the commerce clause pro-
vides a better jurisdictional peg; cf. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409
U.S. 271 (1973) (crash of airliner into navigable waters not a sufficient nexus to confer
admiralty jurisdiction; however, Congress could pass uniform aviation legislation under the
commerce clause).
24 The LHWCA defines employee as "any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any
harbor worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker .... 33 U.S.C. §
902(3) (Supp. V 1975).
21 544 F.2d at 52. This position finds support in IA BENEDICT, supra note 1, § 16, wherein
it is stated:
[L]ongshoremen and persons performing longshoring operation are specifically
included [within the definition of "employee"], and so are harbor workers, ship-
builders, and ship breakers so that in the case of such persons it is quite unnecessary
to engage in any abstract discussion of the meaning of the term "maritime employ-
ment."
Id. (footnote omitted).
21 544 F.2d at 52.
v Id.
U Id. at 53. See S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4707-08.
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majority, "is the functional equivalent of sorting cargo discharged
from a ship; stuffing a container is part of the loading of the ship
even though it is performed on shore and not in the ship's cargo
holds."29 In view of Congress' recognition of the "container revolu-
tion,"30 together with its clear intent to provide coverage for workers
engaged in the loading and unloading of vessels, 31 the court con-
cluded that men who load and unload containers are within the
class "longshoremen" and are protected by the Act so long as they
meet the situs test.3 2 Moreover, finding that the legislative history
of the amendments clearly shows that checkers of container cargo
are within the contemplation of the Act, Judge Friendly indicated
that Blundo must be considered a covered longshoreman. 3
The court then considered the status of Caputo. It has never
been disputed that a worker engaged in loading and unloading who
is in direct contact with the ship is a bona fide longshoreman.3 4
Since Caputo's injury occurred while he was loading a truck at some
21 544 F.2d at 53.
31 The term is used by Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 8.
31 This intent is stated in the negative: "The Committee does not intend to cover employ-
ees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because
they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity." S. REP. No.
1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4708.
32 544 F.2d at 53.
The court declared that "'checkers. . . who are directly involved in the loading and
unloading functions are covered by the new amendment.'" Id., quoting S. REP. No. 1125,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972), reprinted
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4708. The court went no further in its definition of
"longshoremen" than to place container workers within that class. Judge Friendly did indi-
cate, however, that the class does not include everyone who calls himself a longshoreman,
nor everyone who belongs to a longshoreman's union. 544 F.2d at 52. But cf. Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 179 (1976) (member-
ship in a nonmaritime union is evidence that claimant is not engaged in maritime employ-
ment).
Support for the position that workers who stuff, strip, and check containers are long-
shoremen may be found in Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping
Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970). There, the court observed: "Historically the work of
longshoremen included the preparation of cargo for shipment by making up, for example,
drafts and pallets and, in connection with unloading cargo, the breaking up of drafts and
pallets, sorting the cargo according to its consignees and delivering it to the trucks or other
carriers." Id. at 886; accord, Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 401 F. Supp.
1401, 1406 (E.D. Va. 1975); cf. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 815
(2d Cir. 1971) (a container is "functionally a part of a ship").
3, See, e.g., Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426
F.2d 884, 886 (2d Cir. 1970); MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1334 (3d ed.
1971); 1 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 3, at 7 (3d ed. 1975), quoted
in note 81 infra.
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distance from a vessel's side,35 and therefore did not fall either
within this accepted definition or within the class of container-
related longshoremen, Judge Friendly turned to a consideration of
his coverage as a "person engaged in longshoring operations." 3 Tak-
ing the broad view of the loading/unloading process as not complete
until cargo has been delivered to a consignee, 3 and noting the con-
gressional desire to provide "uniformity of coverage for persons en-
gaged in the loading or unloading functions on the piers,"3 the
majority concluded: "The committees' language clearly is broad
enough to cover a person like Caputo who spent a significant part
of his time in working on vessels."39 As a result of the foregoing
analysis, the Pittston court held that in addition to bona fide long-
shoremen, the Act's coverage extends to work-related injuries sus-
tained within its situs by employees who handle cargo in the total
loading/unloading process, provided that such cargo handlers have
"spent a significant part of [their] time in the typical longshoring
activity of taking cargo on or off a vessel.""
Judge Lumbard dissented from the majority's view with respect
to the amendments' scope.41 Finding the "point of rest" limits defi-
nitive of maritime employment and more in harmony with congres-
sional intent, he noted their additional virtue of providing ease of
application. 2 Since the injuries sustained by both Blundo and Ca-
puto occurred well beyond the "point of rest" boundaries, the dis-
sent would have set aside the compensation awards.4 3
13 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
544 F.2d at 54-55.
Id. at 53 & n.21.
Id. at 54. See S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4708.
1, 544 F.2d at 54.
ID Id. at 56. Noting that this was as far as he need go to resolve the instant cases, and
stating his uncertainty as to the necessity for retaining the proviso in future determinations,
Judge Friendly did indicate, however, that he would not go so far as to eliminate the status
requirement entirely. Id. Thus, the Pittston court "parted company" with Professors Gilmore
and Black with regard to their suggestion that all employment related injuries within the situs
of the Act should be covered. Id. at 56 & n.27. See GILMORE & BLACK 2d, supra note 1, § 6-
51, criticized in Owen, Book Review, 7 J. MAR. L. & Com. 736, 742 (1976).
11 544 F.2d at 57 (Lumbard, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Lumbard concurred
only in the dismissals of Dellaventura and Scaffidi, discussed in note 10 supra.
,1 544 F.2d at 57. The dissent relied on I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d
1080 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
petitions for cert. filed sub norn. Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Brown, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S.
Nov. 30, 1976) (No. 76-706), and Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976)
(No. 76-730), discussed in notes 45-54 and accompanying text infra.
,1 544 F.2d at 58.
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The Pittston holding represents a step toward a broad and
humanitarian approach to the construction of the 1972 amend-
ments, and, it is submitted, is an appropriate and reasonable inter-
pretation falling between the extremes espoused by other authori-
ties.44 Illustrative of the narrow view, is the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in L T. 0. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board,45 a decision heavily relied
on by the Pittston dissent. 6 The L T. 0. court held that the area of
coverage was bounded by the first or last "points of rest."47 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the majority emphasized the fact that the
amendments were passed in "direct response" to the 1969 holding
of the Supreme Court in Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson 8 and
the invitation to extend the jurisdiction of the LHWCA issued to
Congress by the Court in that case."
Nacirema involved four longshoremen who were working on a
pier, attaching cargo to a ship's crane for loading. The crane swung
" One extreme is expressed in GILMORE & BLACK 2d, supra note 1, § 6-51, wherein the
authors state:
The Reports do not read as if they had been divinely inspired. As essays in statutory
construction, they do not commend themselves. Apart from the gloss suggested by
the Reports, the 1972 coverage amendments can fairly be read to cover all
employment-related injuries which occur within the Act's territorial limits. And a
female secretary who works in a terminal warehouse should qualify as an LHCA
harbor worker in exactly the same way that a female hair-dresser in a cruise ship's
beauty salon qualifies as a Jones Act seaman.
Id., at 430. For consideration of the other extreme, see Vickery, supra note 5, wherein the
author observes:
The amendments draw a distinction between "longshoring operations" and
"maritime terminal operations". Thus the basic question is: When does the loading
or unloading process begin and end? It is generally considered that the loading
process begins when cargo is picked up from a point of rest on a dock or marine
terminal.
Id. at 68.
4s 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.
1976) (en banc), petitions for cert. filed sub nor. Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Brown, 45
U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976) (No. 76-706), and Adkins v. I.T.O. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W.
3417 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 76-730).
" See 544 F.2d at 57 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
'7 529 F.2d at 1081.
396 U.S. 212 (1969).
Apparently displeased by the results of its decision in Nacirema, the Supreme Court
declared:
There is much to be said for uniform treatment of longshoremen injured while
loading or unloading a ship. But even construing the Extension Act to amend the
Longshoremen's Act would not effect this result, since longshoremen injured on a
pier by pier-based equipment would still remain outside the Act. . . . The invita-
tion to move that line [for coverage] landward must be addressed to Congress, not
to this Court.
396 U.S. at 223-24.
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back and hit the men, throwing three to the pier and one into the
water where he drowned. Since the situs test of the pre-amended
LHWCA required an injury to occur on navigable waters,"0 benefits
were denied to the three men who remained on the pier, while cover-
age extended to the drowned longshoreman. 51
The I. T. 0. majority maintained that the amendments were
enacted to remedy precisely this kind of situation which could occur
only within the "point of rest" parameters. In effect, the court found
that any activity landward of these boundaries is not maritime em-
ployment.52 That this interpretation was appropriate, the court
stated, was further evidenced by the congressional intent "to permit
a uniform compensation system to apply to employees who would
otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their activity. 5 3 Reading
this language as a limitation on coverage, the Fourth Circuit de-
clared that the only effect of the amendments was to provide com-
plete coverage to employees who had been partially covered under
the old provisions. Thus, in the Fourth Circuit's view, coverage
extends only to those workers whose employment brings them suffi-
ciently close to navigable waters that they might actually be injured
upon them. 4
33 U.S.C. § 903 (1970) (amended 1972), discussed in note 1 supra.
" The case of the drowned longshoreman was not taken to the Supreme Court. See
Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Nacirema
Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
12 529 F.2d at 1086-87.
Id. at 1086, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972), reprinted
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 4708.
5, 529 F.2d at 1087 (by implication). The I.T.O. court reviewed awards made to three
employees under the amended LHWCA. Adkins had been injured while loading cargo into a
consignee's truck. The cargo had previously been stripped from a container which had been
unloaded from a ship. Id. at 1082. Brown suffered carbon monoxide poisoning while moving
barrels of chemicals to a container for stuffing prior to being placed aboard a vessel. Id. Harris
was injured while moving an already stuffed container toward a marshaling area located near
a ship. The containers assembled in this area were then moved aboard a vessel. Id.
The strict "point of rest" holding of the majority denied recovery to all three claimants,
since their injuries had occurred outside these limits. Id. at 1087-88. The I.T. 0. dissent, in
contrast, preferred the broad interpretation of maritime employment, and would have af-
firmed the BRB's decisions. Id. at 1089 passim (Craven, J., dissenting). Although asserting
that "'[a] consistent and contemporaneous construction of a statute by the agency charged
with its enforcement is entitled to great deference,'" id. at 1091, quoting NLRB v. Boeing,
412 U.S. 67, 75 (1973), and that the BRB should be-ffirmed on that basis alone, the dissent's
independent analysis was consonant with the BRB position. 529 F.2d at 1095-101.
Although I.T.0. was subsequently reheard en banc, I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd.,
542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), no clear rule emerged from the decision. The three
judges who took part in the original decision maintained their polarized positions. Each side
acquired one new advocate, and the remaining judge, although acquiescing in the "point of
rest" theory, moved that point inland to a location in which "[tihe cargo was not merely
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In contrast to this restrictive view, the BRB appears to have
expanded the Act's scope to its furthest possible limits 5 In addition
to defining the loading/unloading process liberally,5" the Board has
consistently held that a maritime employee need not be actually
engaged in loading or unloading cargo at the time of his injury to
be covered by the Act.17 Moreover, a warehouseman lifting cargo
into a consignee's truck has been held by the BRB to be engaged in
the last step of the unloading process, even after title has passed to
the consignee."8 Indeed, the BRB has held that even an office clerk
employed within the situs of the Act is protected, since the process-
ing of papers is an essential part of the loading/unloading opera-
tion. 9 Furthermore, since in the Board's view the purpose of the
amendments was to extend, rather than to narrow coverage, all
classes of persons eligible for benefits prior to enactment of the
amendments are still covered.6"
being moved to [or from] storage for convenience or facility .. .[but] was in the process
of being loaded [or unloaded] on board ship .... " Id. at 905. This relocated "point of rest"
appears to be the first or last holding area for the cargo as it leaves, or before it enters a
container. See id. Compensation awards to Brown and Harris were approved, the deciding
vote being cast by the judge who moved the "point of rest" landward. Id. Because his injury
occurred beyond the adjusted point, benefits were denied to Adkins. Id.
1 See Doak & Hecker, Is It a New Ball Game? - The 1972 Amendments to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 11 FORUM 544, 549-50 (1976).
" See, e.g., cases cited note 20 supra. Subsequent to the . T. 0. decision the BRB again
rejected the "point of rest" theory, stating:
The Board is well aware of the restrictive interpretation given the status require-
ment by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent case of IT. 0. Corpora-
tion of Baltimore v. Adkins. However, we are of the opinion that our interpretation
with regard to coverage is more in keeping with the amended statute and the
legislative history, and we will continue to follow the line of reasoning developed
in previous decisions and reiterated in this case.
Bradshaw v. J.A. McCarthy, Inc., 3 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 195, 198 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1976)
(citations omitted); accord, Toomer v. Machinery Rental & Employers Nat'l, 4 BEN. REv. BD.
SERV. (MB) 256 (Ben. Rev. Bd. July 23, 1976).
11 See, e.g., Coppolino v. International Terminal Operating Co., 1974 A.M.C. 2423, 1
BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 205 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1974) (longshoreman injured while replacing
paper in a copying machine).
" Richardson v. Great Lakes Storage & Contracting Co., 2 BEN. REV. BD. SEav. (MB)
31 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1975) (delivery of documents does not alter the character of employee's
work).
' Farrell v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 42 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1975).
See, e.g., Sharp v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 2 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 381 (Ben. Rev.
Bd. 1975) (drowned scuba diving teacher is covered); Gilmore v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1975
A.M.C. 811, 1 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 180 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 957 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 179 (1976). In reversing the BRB in Gilmore, the Ninth
Circuit found that a "pondman" who was injured on a floating walkway over navigable waters
while sorting logs was not a maritime employee within the contemplation of the amendments.
528 F.2d at 961-62. Rejecting the Board's determination that all persons eligible for benefits
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It is submitted that the BRB's interpretation is unduly expan-
sive and thus contravenes congressional intent."' While it has been
suggested that since "there can be nothing more maritime than the
sea, every employment on the sea or other navigable waters should
be considered as maritime employment, '6 2 the Board's inclusion of
anyone previously covered disregards the status requirement estab-
lished by Congress.8 3 The strict "point of rest" theory, however, is
equally unsatisfactory. It appears unduly restrictive in failing to
recognize the container revolution and its effect on the nature of the
waterfront activity, a factor specifically noted by Congress." Addi-
tionally, such narrow limits to coverage would appear to frustrate
the congressional desire for uniformity by constructing yet another
artificial barrier between employees engaged in the same type of
operations."
While approaching the statutory analysis from differing direc-
tions, other circuits which have considered the scope of the 1972
amendments have taken positions similar to that of the Pittston
court, short of that espoused by the BRB but beyond the "point of
rest" parameters established by the Fourth Circuit. In Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
under the original LHWCA are still covered, the court stated that "to be entitled to the
benefits of LHCA, an employee's employment must have a realistic relationship to the tradi-
tional work and duties of a ship's service employment." Id. at 961.
62 See Doak & Hecker, Is It a New Ball Game? - The 1972 Amendments to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 11 FORUM 544, 549-50 (1976).
62 1A BENEDicT, supra note 1, § 17 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Parker v. Motor Boat
Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
0 See S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4708. The pertinent
section appears in note 31 supra. In contrast to the BRB's approach, see text accompanying
note 59 supra, coverage for clerical workers was expressly disapproved by Congress in the
following passage: "Thus, employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for
further transshipment would not be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs
do not require them to participate in the loading or unloading of cargo." S. REP. No. 1125,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972), reprinted
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4708. But see GiLmaoE & BLAcK 2d, supra note 1,
§ 6-51, at 430; Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683, 694
(1973).
"3 See S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 10 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4707-08.
"3 See 544 F.2d at 54. Judge Friendly discussed a hypothetical in which a single long-
shoreman, after being engaged in an activity within the "point of rest" parameters, might
then move the cargo away from its first "point of rest" to another holding area further inland.
Under the narrow coverage theory, this worker would have walked out of the protected area
during his second operation. Judge Friendly found that such a result would be contrary to
the congressional desire for uniformity of coverage. Id.
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Programs,66 the Third Circuit was presented with a claim by a trac-
tor rig driver who was required to haul containers and crates through
city streets between two waterfront facilities. Having transported a
container recently unloaded from a ship to another berth for storage,
he was injured on his return trip while hauling a crate. The accident
occurred on a city street. 7 In contrast to the Second Circuit's rea-
soning, the Sea-Land court did not attempt to define the terms
"longshoreman" or "person engaged in longshoring operations" as
criteria for coverage, but instead dealt with the broader category
"any person engaged in maritime employment."68 The court
emerged with a definition of this term which encompasses all work-
ers engaged in the movement of cargo in connection with its water-
borne mode of transportation until its delivery to a person involved
in land or .air transportation. According to the Third Circuit,
"[tihe key is the functional relationship of the employee's activity
to maritime transportation . "6... 9 Since the Sea-Land claimant
was employed by an intermodal carrier engaged in both land and
water transportation of goods, and it was not clear in which phase
of the business the claimant was participating at the time of the
accident, the case was remanded to the BRB to make that determi-
nation.7 0
Rejecting job classification entirely as a basis for coverage, the
Fifth Circuit, in Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue,71 relied in-
stead on the congressional language which stated that a worker
6 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976).
67 Id. at 632, 639.
" Id. at 638. The court first found that Congress intended coverage for all "maritime"
employees. Id. Having made this determination, the Third Circuit then disposed of the situs
problem by holding that coverage of an employee engaged in a protected activity is not
necessarily vitiated simply because the injury does not occur in a locality enumerated in 33
U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. V 1975). The Sea-Land court stated: "The limit of federal coverage
is defined not by reference to a geographic relationship with the navigable waters of the
United States, but by the location of the interface between the air land and the water modes
of transportation." 540 F.2d at 638.
540 F.2d at 638.
o The court found that the claimant was clearly engaged in a waterborne transportation
activity during his initial trip since he was hauling a container that had recently been taken
off a ship. Id. at 639. Since information was lacking with regard to both the contents and the
ultimate destination of the crate being carried at the time of the accident, however, it was
impossible to determine whether the claimant was then performing a land or water function.
Id.
71 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), petitions for cert. filed sub nom. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford,
45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976) (No. 76-641), and Halter Marine Fabricators, Inc. v.
Nulty, 45 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1977) (No. 76-880). The court found that definitions
of "maritime employment" developed prior to the amendments were irrelevant since they
spoke to the limited coverage of the former Act. 539 F.2d at 538-39.
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would be covered if he were" 'engaged in loading, unloading, repair-
ing, or building a vessel.' ",72 In this court's view, the sole test is
whether, at the time of his injury, an employee was actually engaged
or directly involved in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
ship.73 Since the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the "point of rest"
theory and embraced a broad view of loading and unloading, 74 its
interpretation is an expansive one, as evidenced by its holding that
a claimant who was injured while securing cargo to a railway car for
inland transportation was engaged in the final step of the unloading
process and was therefore covered.
Asked to decide whether a claimant injured while stripping a
container was within the ambit of the 1972 amendments, the First
Circuit answered in the affirmative in Stockman v. John T. Clark
& Son.71 Applying a rationale similar to that of the Pittston court,
the First Circuit found that persons who stuff and strip containers
are "bona fide longshoremen" whose injuries are compensable under
the Act, 77 and that once this status is established no further showing
is necessary.78 While limiting its holding to this class of employees,
the Stockman court expressly rejected the "point of rest" parame-
ters and adopted the liberal view of the loading/unloading process, 7
implying that were the court to be presented with a claimant who
was injured within the terminal area while performing some part of
this total process, it would find him to be a member of a covered
class of workers. 80
In the final analysis, the several tests enunciated by First,
Third, and Fifth Circuits all appear to extend coverage to every
employee engaged in the movement of cargo in the service of a
waterborne transportation employer, if the employee was injured
72 Id. at 539, quoting S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4708.
13 539 F.2d at 539-40.
71 Id. at 540.
11 Id. at 543. The cargo had arrived by ship several days before the accident, and had
been held in the waterfront area awaiting transshipment. In upholding the claimant's com-
pensation award under the amendments, the Fifth Circuit found that at the time of the
injury, he was performing "an integral part of the process of moving maritime cargo from a
ship to land transportation," and was therefore within the scope of the amendments.
76 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Nov. 2,
1976) (No. 76-571).
" 539 F.2d at 276-77.
19 The First Circuit stated: "Whatever the language of the committee reports, the statute
itself calls for no additional showing once that status has been firmly established." Id. at
277.
79 Id. at 275-76.
11 Id. at 276-77.
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while performing his duties within areas customarily used for load-
ing and unloading waterborne commodities. This coverage seem-
ingly obtains without regard to the first or last "point of rest,"'8' the
length of time that the cargo has been held on the pier awaiting a
consignee's pickup, the transportation of the cargo through non-
maritime areas, from one waterfront facility to another, and the
amount of time, if any, that a worker engaged in loading or unload-
ing has spent aboard a ship. All of the aforementioned circuits also
apparently exclude nonlongshoring personnel such as clerical work-
ers.
The bottom line in Pittston differs only with respect to Judge
Friendly's proviso requiring direct contact with a ship for persons
engaged in longshoring operations.2 It is submitted that this proviso
is inappropriate. Having adopted the broad view of the load-
ing/unloading process as definitive of longshoring operations, the
Pittston court placed workers such as Caputo squarely within the
ambit of the statute without need for the further requirement. If all
longshoremen are covered without regard to time spent shipboard,
it appears logical that all persons engaged in longshoring operations
should enjoy the benefit of the same statutory construction.83 Fur-
81 Judicial interpretations of loading and unloading, some expressed prior to the 1972
amendments, add support to this position. See, e.g., Garrett v. Gutzeit OY, 491 F.2d 228
(4th Cir. 1974); Law v. Victory Carriers, 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
404 U.S. 202 (1971); Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938
(1965).
Additional support for this position is found in 1 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME
PERSONAL INJURIES § 3, at 7 (3d ed. 1975), wherein the author states: "Outside of cargo work
in the holds, longshoremen are engaged in various tasks in connection with voyage prepara-
tion or termination . . . .[T]he work may be performed entirely on a pier in the handling
of mechanical equipment, or the storing, moving or loading of goods on the dock." Id. (foot-
note omitted) (emphasis added).
82 The Pittston court used the words "provided .. .that the employee has spent a
significant part of his time in the typical longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off a
vessel." 544 F.2d at 56 (emphasis added). It is not clear whether the court meant time actually
aboard a vessel, or time spent within the first or last points of rest. The First Circuit has since
interpreted the Pittston court's statement as requiring time aboard ship. Stockman v. John
T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264, 276 (1st Cir. 1976).
The difficulty with extending protection to workers who spend their time entirely on
shore stems in large part from the following sentence in the Committee Report: "The intent
of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation system to apply to employees who
would otherwise be covered for part of their activity." S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4708. Since coverage prior to the amendments only obtained if an
injury occurred on navigable waters, this sentence would seem to imply that part of a worker's
time must still be spent on navigable waters. The First Circuit, however, has developed a
more liberal interpretation of this statement:
While Congress did not mean in the 1972 amendments to cover new classes of
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thermore, a consideration of the consequences of this proviso beto-
kens serious problems in its application84 and, more importantly,
continuing disparities in coverage for shore-based harbor workers,
dependent upon length of time spent aboard ship. It seems apparent
that the intention of Congress was to create a comprehensive work-
men's compensation statute for all those employees who are custom-
arily thought of as longshoring workers," and to avoid arbitrary
cutoff points which would otherwise partition a homogeneous work
force, and might provide only part time protection for an individual
employee.8"
It is submitted that the better view is that articulated by the
Third and Fifth Circuits, and suggested by the First.87 This interpre-
tation has the additional advantage of serving the goals of certainty
and predictability of remedy for both employee and employer. It
must be noted that Judge Friendly expressed his uncertainty about
the necessity for retaining the proviso in subsequent determina-
tions,88 and no doubt the future will see amplification by the Second
employees not heretofore covered in part, we do not believe it meant to exclude from
coverage those particular members of a covered group, e.g. longshoremen, whose
individual duties do not happen to take them on shipboard. We read the language
of the committee reports as requiring bona fide membership in a class of employees
whose members would for the most part have been covered some of the time under
the earlier Act - not necessarily a demonstration by each claimant that he individ-
ually would have been covered.
Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264, 277 (1st Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). It is
submitted that this interpretation is more in harmony with the congressional intent to create
uniformity of coverage.
81 Initially, it would have to be determined whether an employee falls into the class of
"bona fide longshoremen," or is merely a "person engaged in longshoring operations." Having
made this difficult determination, it would then be necessary to ascertain whether the long-
shoring activity has included time spent in direct contact with a ship. Finally, the question
of how much time is a "significant" amount would have to be resolved. Even then, a number
of unanswered questions would remain. For example, would a longshoring worker, injured
during his first day on the job, be covered if he had not yet stepped aboard a ship?
See 118 CONG. REC. 36,385 (1972) (questions and answers submitted by Rep. Steiger).
As Representative Steiger declared, "Ithe expansion of coverage is intended to bring about
a measure of compensation uniformity applicable to persons customarily considered to be
working in the business." Id.
"8 As indicated by the many questions posed by the Pittston court, 544 F.2d at 47,
standard operating procedures with regard to the allocation of work assignments is unclear.
Thus, it might be possible for an employee to operate as a container stripper on one day and
thereby automatically be within the ambit of the Act, and on another day be assigned to move
break-bulk cargo within the terminal area, and thus be subject to the Pittston proviso.
Although finding it unnecessary to decide what requirements exist for maritime work-
ers other than container workers, the First Circuit implied that time in actual contact with a
ship would not be a critical issue. Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d at 277. See
note 83 supra.
" 544 F.2d at 86.
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Circuit. At any rate, since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in Pittston,81 it is to be hoped that the existing conflicts will soon
be resolved.
Judith B. Yaeger
" Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976) (No. 76-444).
